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Abstract
Decentering is a ubiquitous therapeutic concept featuring in multiple schools of psychological intervention and
science. It describes an ability to notice to day-to-day psychological stressors (negative thoughts, feelings, and
memories) from an objective self-perspective and without perseverating on the themes they represent. Thus,
decentering dampens the impact and distress associated with psychological stressors that can otherwise increase
mental ill health in vulnerable individuals. Importantly, the strengthening of decentering-related abilities has been
flagged as a core component of psychological interventions that treat and prevent anxiety and depression. We
provide an in-depth review evidence of the salutary effects of decentering with a special focus on youth mental
health. This is because adolescence is a critical window for the development of psychopathology but is often under-
represented in this research line. A narrative synthesis is presented that integrates and summarizes findings on a range
of decentering-related abilities. Section 1 reviews extant conceptualizations of decentering and data-driven
approaches to characterize its characteristic. A novel definition is then offered to guide future empirical research.
Section 2 overviews laboratory-based research into the development of decentering as well as its relationship with
anxiety and depression. Section 3 examines the role decentering-related skills play in psychological interventions for
anxiety and depression. Critically, we review evidence that treatment-related increases in decentering predict latter
reductions in anxiety and depression severity. Each section highlights important areas for future research. The report
concludes by addressing the vital questions of whether, how, why and when decentering alleviates youth anxiety and
depression.
Introduction
People reflect on their feelings, memories, and thoughts
– especially emotional ones – to abstract meaning about
themselves. This practice of mentalizing emerges early in
life1,2 and it can promote either psychological well-being
or mental ill-health3. An example of adaptive self-
observation is to notice, not only the negative content
of inner events, but also the cognitive activities that
generate them. This self-observation technique – referred
to as decentering or decentering-related abilities – allows
individuals to experience distressing inner events as
imperfect models of the real-world rather than precise
reflections. Adopting this objective self-perspective can
thus prevent inner events from disproportionately influ-
encing affect, behavior and sense-of-self. For instance,
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a person might notice “I am thinking I am depressed right
now” instead of only noticing and then believing the
thought “I am depressed”4. Decentering is therefore dia-
metric to more maladaptive self-observation styles e.g. a
tendency to view inner events, and the themes they
represent, as genuine and immutable facts.
Therapeutic techniques that target decentering are
ubiquitous across psychological therapy and science. In
fact, the strengthening of decentering-related abilities
has long been highlighted as a core component through
which multiple interventions accrue positive mental
health outcomes5,6. This review integrates evidence from
different approaches to determine whether, how, why
and when decentering-related abilities alleviate youth
anxiety and depression. Findings are based on a review
of peer-reviewed studies of decentering and related
constructs (for methods, see Supplemental Materials).
We present a narrative synthesis of the literature across
three sections that: (1) characterize and define decen-
tering; (2) chart the development of decentering, and
its relationship with anxiety and depression; and (3)
examine the mediating role of decentering in evidence-
based psychological interventions. The clinical implica-
tions of decentering and directions for further research
are highlight throughout these sections (also, see Sup-
plemental Box 1). Furthermore, insights on decentering
from a panel of youth advisors is outlined in Supple-
mental Boxes 2–5.
Foundations of decentering
Defining and measuring decentering
Different terms describe an ability to notice negative inner
events from an objective perspective without excessively
and inappropriately reacting to their content (Table 1)7.
Within mindfulness-based treatments, decentering is an
ability to observe thoughts/feelings as temporary events in
the mind rather than true reflections of reality and the self8.
This cognitive set may reduce the tendency to treat inner
events like genuine realities and dampen accompanying
distress. Detached mindfulness is the ability to detach from
thoughts by observing them from an objective perspective9.
This entails a meta-cognitive processing mode wherein
thoughts are interpreted as transient mental events.
Reperceiving is also a meta-cognitive skill characterized by
an ability to shift one’s perspective and dis-identify from the
content of negative inner events10. Likewise, meta-cognitive
awareness is referred to as a cognitive processing mode in
which thoughts/memories are interpreted with the knowl-
edge that they are transient mental events rather than
defining characteristics of the self or reality – this disen-
gagement from the distressing content of inner events
undermines their influence over emotion and behavior.
Within acceptance-based treatments, cognitive defusion –
originally called comprehensive distancing11 – describes a
way of responding to negative thoughts that entails dis-
engaging from their literal meaning12,13. This is achieved
through exercises that putatively disrupt verbal processes
that transfer meaning between inner events (like
thoughts) and their referents (like events)14–17.
Acceptance-based treatments also refer to the self-as-
context, or observer-self perspective, as a distanced locus
from which the ‘self’ is discriminated from the flow of
thoughts, feelings and memories it encounters. Similarly,
the salutary effects of processing negative inner events
from a third-person perspective, rather than from an ego-
centric perspective, is emphasized in Cognitive Behavioral
Therapy (CBT). This is called self-distancing18 and it is
shaped though exercises that place ‘psychological dis-
tance’ between an individual and their inner events, thus
allowing individuals to reconstrue negative experiences
within a broader context19,20.
These therapeutic constructs broadly overlap but are
not necessarily inter-changeable. Scientific traditions
focus on particular characteristics when describing
decentering, e.g., a shift in self-perspective versus a
change in emotional reactivity. Constructs can also refer
to discrete hypothetical pathways when accounting for the
impact decentering on outcomes like emotional state, e.g.,
change in how self-relevant information is represented in
memory versus disruption of verbal processing (Table 1).
Such pre-experimental assumptions about the phenom-
enology of decentering can complicate scientific progress.
Specifically, the reliable measurement of decentering is
difficult because assessments from different approaches
target different features. The Experiences Questionnaire
(EQ; the mostly widely used self-report assessment of
decentering) correlates only modestly with other inven-
tories including the decentering sub-scale of the Toronto
Mindfulness Scale (TMS) (r= 0.25) and the Meta-
cognitive Awareness Scale (MAS) (r=−0.16) (M ± SD
= 23.81 ± 4.06 years)21. In contrast, EQ scores correlate
more strongly with the decentering sub-scale of the
Questionnaire on Self-Transcendence (r= 0.68−0.77)22
as well as self-rated inventories of cognitive defusion,
although not to the level one would expect if they were
capturing the exact same trait. EQ scores are moderately
strongly associated with the Drexel Defusion Scale (DDS)
(r= 0.39–0.52), Cognitive Fusion Questionnaire (CFQ)
(r=−0.40 to −0.61) and Acceptance and Action Ques-
tionnaire (AAQ) (r=−0.67) (19.10–39.57 years)21,23–27.
EQ scores and the self-rated ability to observe negative
inner events from a distanced self-perspective are also
moderately associated (r= 0.49) (20.7 ± 2.56 years)28. The
lack of a common model and measure of decentering
represents a clear barrier to the discovery and synthesis of
new information.
There is a need to develop working definitions of
decentering, which can be shared across different
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scientific traditions, and testable theoretical frameworks.
A recent example is the meta-cognitive model of decen-
tering7,21. This posits that decentering is a multi-faceted
construct involving: [1] the disidentification from negative
inner experiences, i.e., an ability to separate one’s self
from the content of inner events; and [2] a diminished
emotional reactivity to inner events. Furthermore, the
mechanism that facilitates disidentification and reduced
reactivity is [3] a heightened meta-awareness of under-
lying cognitive activities. Another example is a recent
neurocognitive account of self-distancing – a popular
decentering technique in CBT20,29,30. This model suggests
that a series of neurocognitive processes is implemented
by discrete neural regions so to reduce negative emotional
states. This begins with a regulatory goal (i.e. feeling less
distress), formulated and maintained in working memory,
and supported by the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex,
anterior cingulate cortex and the pre-sensory motor area.
Individuals then engage in affective self-reflection, sup-
ported by the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, to recognize
problematic emotional states and stressors. A complex
process of self-projection then starts wherein individuals
mentally simulate themselves in an alternative space or
shifted perspective. This calls on earlier memories and
knowledge, supported by the medial temporal lobe, and a
capacity to manipulate self-relevant information, sup-
ported by the temporal parietal junction. Any change in
the initial emotional state is tracked via affective self-
reflection so to monitor progress towards the regulatory
goal. Meanwhile, new emotional states become possible as
individuals perceive surrounding events from a new self-
perspective, and this is implemented by areas including
the amygdala and ventromedial prefrontal cortex. These
models clearly formulate decentering-related abilities in
the context of established neuro-cognitive mechanisms.
However, there is a paucity of empirical research exam-
ining these neuro-cognitive accounts21,30.
Characterizing and re-defining decentering
There have been data-driven attempts to extract key
decentering characteristics. In adolescents (19.10 ± 1.60
years), factor analysis indicated two components under-
lying decentering and cognitive defusion inventories24. The
first factor was labeled Observer Perspective. This involved
an ability to discriminate the self from the inner events it
encounters (it included both decentering and cognitive
defusion items)24. The second factor was labeled Reduced
Struggle. This involved dampened emotional reactivity
towards negative content of these inner events (it included
cognitive defusion items only)24. This bivariate structure
underpinning decentering-related measures is reported
elsewhere. In emerging adults (23.81 ± 4.06 years), two
factors explained responses on decentering, meta-cognitive
awareness31, and cognitive defusion inventories21. The first
was labeled Intentional Decentered Perspective. This
captured the ability to adopt a dis-engaged and non-
reactive perspective towards inner events; this resembles
the Observer Perspective factor. The second factor was
labeled Automatic Reactivity to Thought Content. This
reflected heightened emotional reactivity to the negative
content of thoughts; an inverse of Reduced Struggle.
Similar factors have been reported within the Self-As-
Context Scale (SACS) and EQ32,33. A reanalysis of the EQ
in adult experiencing pain-related distress revealed two
factors (47.3 ± 11.69 years)34. These were labeled Self-as-
Context and Cognitive Fusion (cognitive fusion is simply
the inverse of cognitive defusion). The former captured an
ability to discriminate one’s self from the flow of negative
thoughts it encounters – resembling the Observer Per-
spective factor. The latter reflected a reduced emotional
reactivity to negative thoughts – resembling the Reduced
Struggle factor.
These findings suggest two facets underlying measures
decentering. The first is an ability to intentionally disen-
gage from the content of inner events by shifting one’s
experiential perspective. The second relates to the specific
impact of this shift in self-perspective on negative affect;
namely, the reduced emotional reactivity to the content of
negative inner events. Therefore, we might introduce a
novel definition of decentering in the context of negative
inner events and emotional states: decentering involves an
observed change in emotional reactivity towards negative
inner events (like distressing thoughts, memories and
feelings) that is associated with a self-reported shift in
one’s awareness – away from the thematic content of
those events – towards the cognitive activities underlying
these events. This working definition effectively oper-
ationalizes decentering as it communicates specific and
measurable characteristics that can be examined across
different scientific and therapeutic traditions. This could
also guide new inventories as well as fundamental
laboratory research into decentering and its neuro-
cognitive correlates. Importantly, this descriptive defini-
tion is also agnostic in terms of underlying cognitive
mechanism. Definitions based on functional character-
istic, rather than a hypothetical mechanism of change,
promote better integration of different psychological tra-
ditions35. This approach also adheres to a fundamental
scientific principle: the phenomenon that needs to be
explained (explanandum; i.e. decentering) ought to be
defined independently from the mechanism used to
explain it (explanans; e.g. meta-awareness).
Decentering, development, and mental health
The emergence and neuro-cognitive basis of decentering
Evidence suggests that the ability to decenter from
everyday negative inner events is continuously dis-
tributed4,28,32,36,37. Those at the lower end of this
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continuum are more likely to focus on the thematic
content of negative inner events and rely on this infor-
mation to guide behavior and decision-making4,36. That
is, inner events are treated as precise models of the real-
world. Individuals situated at the higher end of this con-
tinuum are instead likely to disengage from negative
content by adopting an objective self-perspective4,36. That
is, inner events are experienced with a greater awareness
of their cognitive underpinnings. There are few investi-
gations charting when, and how, this trait emerges.
However, laboratory studies indicate that children as
young as 4 years can recruit decentering-related abilities
to down-regulate negative emotional states38,39.
Across three studies, 4–6 year olds but not 3 year olds
showed improved behavioral performance39,40 and less
frustration41 during a difficult cognitive task once a decen-
tered self-perspective was adopted (42.51–71.70 months).
Decentering was prompted via instructions to adopt a third-
person perspective (e.g. talking aloud using their first-name
when finding the task stressful) or an objective perspective
(e.g. pretending they are someone who would be good at
problem-solving like Batman) during frustrating moments
of the task. Other studies examined if children and ado-
lescents can decenter from distressing self-relevant events
such as negative memories. Here, 10–11 year olds were
instructed to recall a fight from the point-of-view of a
neutral observer – a self-distanced perspective42. This les-
sened negative feelings and physical reactions relative to
those who recalled the conflict as if they were reliving it – a
self-immersed perspective.
Evidence also points to the spontaneous use of decen-
tering to reduce negative affect during childhood and
adolescence. One study asked 10–20 year olds to verbalize
their thoughts and feelings while viewing aversive ima-
ges43. Self-distancing language increased in those who
actively attempted to down-regulate emotional response.
This was characterized by the less frequent use of first-
person singular pronouns like I/me. Importantly, increa-
ses in self-distancing language also predicted lower self-
rated psychological distress. Another study first instructed
10–17 years old participants to vividly imagine a specific
worry about the future38. They then rated the extent to
which they imagined this event from a self-immersed (‘as
if watching things through their own eye’) or self-
distanced perspective (‘as if watching themselves in a
movie’). Individual differences in decentering were
observed with higher self-distance ratings predicting less
intense emotional reactivity.
These findings suggest that decentering is an early
emergent skill that attenuates emotional reactivity
towards negative inner events. This is evident from early
childhood studies in which decentering was used spon-
taneously or because of direct instructions. A small
number of studies additionally report that this ability
increases over time38,43,44, likely due to age-related
improvements in executive functioning41. Relatedly,
some have attempted to elucidate the neuro-cognitive
mechanisms underlying the impact of decentering on
emotion. Adults are typically instructed to decenter from
negative psychological stressors with simultaneous
recording of fMRI. Findings suggest lower activity in areas
associated with (intrapersonal) cognitive conflict and
affective processing when decentering from negative
memories relative to a comparison condition in which no
attempt was made to alter ones experiences – brain
regions included the medial and ventrolateral prefrontal
cortex as well as the subgenual anterior cingulate45. Also,
increased activity in areas associated with perspective
taking predicted lower negative affect when decentering
relative to the comparison condition – this included the
superior parietal lobule, caudate and medial frontal gyrus.
Increased activity in areas associated with perspective
taking and social perception is also reported when indi-
viduals practiced self-distancing from negative images46.
This included the posterior cingulate and temporal gyrus.
However, few have explored the neuro-cognitive processes
that mediate the impact of decentering based techniques
on negative emotional states29,30. Such research may
account for individual differences documented in decen-
tering research and present ways optimize extant techni-
ques within psychological interventions.
The association between decentering and mental health
Those with poor decentering-related abilities are at
risk of increased anxiety and depression and lower
psycho-social functioning. The earliest reported evi-
dence for this association is during adolescence using the
Youth Avoidance and Fusion Questionnaire (Y-AFQ) – a
self-report assessment of trait cognitive fusion and
affective responding towards distressing inner events.
Here, higher scores equate to poorer decentering-related
abilities. There is a moderate-strong association between
Y-AFQ scores and adolescent anxiety (r= 0.49–0.69);
that is, anxiety severity increases with the tendency to
reify the content of negative inner events37,44,47 (12–17
years). A medium–strong association between Y-AFQ
scores and adolescent depression is also reported (r=
0.55–0.75)44,47,48 (12–16 years). Similarly, a lower ability
to adopt a ‘self-as-context’ or ‘observer’ perspective
towards inner events is associated with increased inter-
nalizing difficulties (r=−0.476) (15.69 ± 0.56 years)49.
This was estimated using the Self-As-Context Scale
(SACS).
The Y-AFQ is almost exclusively used in adolescent
research (12–16 years) while a range of inventories exist
for research in older cohorts. Nevertheless, the negative
association between decentering-related abilities and
symptoms severity persists across development. During
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later adolescence (~19 years), lower self-rated decentering
is associated with increased anxiety, distress and depres-
sion. This has been reported in studies using the EQ
(r anxiety=−0.39) (r depression=−0.21 to −0.41)4,33,50,
the SACS (r distress=−0.34)49 and TDS (r distress=
−0.45) (r depression=−0.20) (19–21 years)28. This
negative association is also reported during adulthood
using the EQ (r anxiety=−0.33 to −0.39; r depression=
−0.39 to −0.4)23,26 and CFQ (r anxiety= 0.53–0.64)
(r depression=−0.45 to −0.61)25,36,51 (higher CFQ=
poorer decentering). The distancing sub-scale of the
recently developed Questionnaire on Self-Transcendence
also revealed a negative association between self-rated
distancing ability and anxiety and depression symptoms in
both adolescents (18.89 ± 1.90 years; r anxiety=−0.30;
r depression=−0.42) and adults (35.21 ± 11.06 years; r
anxiety=−0.3; r depression=−0.48). Additionally, lower
self-rated decentering is associated with poorer psycho-
social functioning. This is reported across the lifespan:
during earlier adolescence via cognitive fusion measures
(Y-AFQ, CFQ; r=−0.63 to −0.64) (12–13 years)23,48;
during late adolescence via self-distancing measures
(TMDS; r= 0.28) and self-as-context (SACS) (r= 0.42)
(~21 years)28,32; and during adulthood via cognitive fusion
measures (CFQ) (r= 0.21–0.45) (35–43 years)36,51.
Decentering attenuates the impact of negative inner
events
Decentering is clearly associated with anxiety and
depression from an early age. A key question is – how are
they related? One possibility is that an ability to decenter
actively protects individuals against, and promotes
recovery from, anxiety and depression symptoms7,52–54.
This is because decentering attenuates the impact and
distress associated with day-to-day psychological stres-
sors, which otherwise increase the risk of anxiety and
depression onset and maintenance in vulnerable indivi-
duals. Such stressors involve inner events like critical self-
relevant thoughts or unpleasant memories or feelings55.
The evidence for this pathway is three-fold.
First, laboratory-based experimental studies with chil-
dren and adolescents indicate that adopting a decentered
perspective (e.g. instructions to adopt a third-person
perspective or re-perceive events ‘as if watching them-
selves in a movie’) dampens emotional reactivity towards
aversive stimuli. Stimuli include unpleasant images, video
clips or self-relevant statements while emotion change is
proxied by decreased negative affect ratings43,56–58,
reduced believability of inner events59–63, lower aggressive
behaviors64 and shorter emotional episodes65. Second,
cross-sectional studies indicate that the positive associa-
tion between psychological stressors and distress is
lessened as decentering-related abilities increase. These
stressors include negative feelings66,67, ruminative
thinking23,34, early emotional memories68, and physical
pain34. For example, one study indicated that the positive
association between unpleasant feelings and depression
severity grew weaker as self-rated decentering increased
(~19 years)67. Increased decentering also dampened the
positive association between unpleasant feelings and
anxiety severity67. Third, improvements in decentering-
related abilities that are accrued during psychological
interventions predict reduced anxiety and depression69–71
(section 4).
Future research should characterize the relationship
between decentering and mental health starting from
early childhood. Longitudinal studies are required to
establish: [1] whether improved decentering-related abil-
ities predict future resilience against anxiety and depres-
sion, thus establishing whether decentering is a protective
skill in mental health: and [2] when the spontaneous use
of decentering begins to impact affect, thus identifying
critical periods for training and intervention. These issues
remain unexplored since much research takes place after
the typical age-of-onset for anxiety and depression. Such
investigations would also benefit from reliable and child/
adolescent friendly measurements of decentering (e.g.
youth variants of the EQ or CFQ) as well as more
objective, performance-based tests of decentering-related
skills72.
Decentering in psychological interventions
The reinforcement of decentering
Decentering is a malleable ability that is strengthened in a
myriad of psychological interventions (Table 2). In adults
seeking treatment for anxiety and depression, medium-large
increases in self-rated decentering are reported following
CBT (d= 0.7–0.82) (~43 years)52,73, mindfulness-based
interventions (d= 0.6–1.01) (34.49–53.30 years)26,52,74–76
and acceptance-based therapies (d= 0.32–1.85) (37.00–46.40
years)73,77–80. Increased self-rated decentering is also repor-
ted following emotion regulation training81 and relaxation
training80,82. Others estimated session-by-session increases in
self-rated decentering through intense repeated-measures
designs. In adults with anxiety, EQ scores increased by a
unit of 0.49–0.66 per session of CBT and 1.5 per four
sessions of Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT).
Specifically, adults began treatment with EQ scores of
around 29.32–34.99 (±6.12–6.17) and this grew by a unit
of 0.37–0.66 per session (27.8–34.41 years)70,71,82. In
adults seeking treatment for anxiety, self-rated cognitive
fusion increased by a unit of 1.36 per CBT session and by
1.96 per ACT session (M baseline = 18.45–18.34) (37 ±
11.80 years). While these studies assume gradual changes
in decentering across psychological interventions, there is
also evidence of curvilinear growth during ACT and
CBT83. This is characterized by an initial, rapid increase in
decentering that flattens over time. Decentering thus is a
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sensitive psychological ability and gains may be quickly
accrued during early stages of therapy.
An important question is– how can different psycho-
logical interventions, each grounded in distinct philoso-
phical and scientific traditions, commonly improve
decentering? This is arguably because interventions
employ techniques that have a shared intention to influ-
ence the way individuals relate to, and observe, day-to-day
psychological stressors (like thoughts, feelings and mem-
ories). In doing so, these techniques recruit and refine the
ability to adopt an objective awareness of negative inner
events and their underlying cognitive activities. This is an
explicit focus within third-generation treatments includ-
ing ACT and Mindfulness-based Cognitive Therapy
(MBCT)12. Techniques like the mindful monitoring of
experiences and cognitive defusion explicitly undefined
the content of negative inner events while encouraging a
meta-awareness of activities such as the act of thinking,
remembering, or mind-wandering14,84–86. This is reflected
by evidence that the negative association between trait
mindfulness and anxiety severity is partially mediated by
decentering-related abilities69,87. Other approaches like
CBT indirectly cultivate decentering via exercises that
challenge the content of negative inner events. Techni-
ques like cognitive restructuring or re-appraisal first
prompt individuals to self-distance by taking an objective
perspective and identifying distorted beliefs before testing
their reliability88. Indeed, the salutary effects of re-
appraisal strategies on anxiety may be mediated by
decentering-related abilities69,71,81.
Psychological interventions that explicitly target
decentering may shape this ability even better. Greater
increases in decentering were found across ACT relative
to CBT73,89 or relaxation training80. Although these
findings are equivocal with others reporting non-
significant effects of intervention-type on decenter-
ing82,83. Regardless, psychological interventions gradually
reinforce decentering by targeting the way individuals
relate to, or experience, negative inner events. At-home
practice of MBCT and CBT skills in the weeks following
treatment predicted increases in decentering over
24 months in adults in remission from depression
(40.41 ± 11.61 years)90. It is difficult to explain the
observed increases in decentering across psychological
interventions through other parsimonious accounts. It
could be, for instance, that increases in decentering
simply reflect treatment-related decreases in anxiety/
depression. Indeed, anti-depressant medication indirectly
increased self-rated decentering in adults experiencing
depression via decreases in depression severity74. Yet this
study also reported continued gains in decentering in a
sub-set of individuals who went on to complete MBCT
and not those who continued with anti-depressant
medication. This suggests that ameliorating symptom
severity partially improves decentering tendencies but
more substantial gains in this skill may be unique to
participation in psychological interventions. However,
few have examined treatment-related increases in
decentering outside of psychological interventions. The
specificity of this therapeutic component and the exact
mechanism through which clinical changes take place
therefore remain unclear.
Increases in decentering mediate reductions in symptom
severity
The reinforcement of decentering skills may be a
common pathway through which different psychological
interventions – like CBT, ACT, and MCBT, among others
– commonly reduce anxiety and depression symptoms
(Table 2). Treatment-related increases in decentering
mediated the impact of mindfulness training on anxiety
severity in adults seeking treatment for generalized anxi-
ety disorder (GAD) (37.6 ± 11.6 years)87. In a similar
group, the rate at which decentering increased across
treatment was associated with overall decreases in worry
(r=−0.74) and stress (r=−0.76; this study involved
acceptance-based treatment and applied relaxation)
(34.14 ± 12.14 years)82. Session-by-session increases in
decentering also predicted treatment-related decreases in
social anxiety in adults seeking treatment through CBT
(27.90 ± 10.06 years)70,71. Within acceptance-based treat-
ments, increases in cognitive defusion predicted decreases
in depression symptoms and psycho-social dysfunction in
adults experiencing pain-related distress (46.40 ± 11.6
years)73,79. Additionally, and in adults seeking treatment
for multiple anxiety disorders, session-by-session increa-
ses in self-rated cognitive defusion mediated decreases in
worry, depression, avoidance and psycho-social dysfunc-
tion – this was evident in both ACT and CBT89. Similar
findings were reported in a transdiagnostic sample of
young adults experiencing anxiety and mood-related
disorders. Here, treatment-related increases in cognitive
fusion mediated decreases in symptom intensity (25.40 ±
7.86 years)83.
Most studies cannot detect if decentering improves
before symptoms decrease. This is a necessary criterion
when establishing mediators of therapeutic change91. A
small number of studies have therefore measured decen-
tering and clinical outcomes more frequently – on a near
session-by-session basis – to better infer a causal con-
nection between decentering and clinical outcomes. In
adults with GAD, a unidirectional relationship between
improved decentering and reduced stress was identified
during acceptance-based treatments and applied relaxa-
tion. This was characterized by decreases in stress
occurring downstream to increased EQ scores (34.41 ±
12.14 years)82. A unidirectional relationship was also
demonstrated in young adults seeking treatment for GAD
Bennett et al. Translational Psychiatry          (2021) 11:288 Page 9 of 14
via emotional regulation training (37.60 ± 11.70 years)81.
Session-by-session increases in EQ scores were found to
precede decrease in trait anxiety but not generalized
anxiety symptoms. To our knowledge, there have been
no attempts to chart the temporal relationship between
increased decreased and reduced symptoms in standard
interventions like CBT, ACT and MBCT. Future
research ought to leverage high-resolution datasets to
replicate and extend on these findings92. Nevertheless,
emerging evidence suggests that early treatment-related
increases in decentering facilitate subsequent improve-
ments outcomes like anxiety, depression and psycho-
social functioning.
Decentering across different stages of mental health
difficulties
The strengthening of decentering-related abilities may
be a universally relevant component of psychological
intervention. Techniques that target this skill could ben-
efit those who are symptomatic, those who are experi-
encing remission and those who are even yet to develop
mental health difficultie. This is because the ability to
decenter mitigates the impact and distress associated with
everyday psychological stressors experienced by most
people.
In adults experiencing remission from depression, ear-
lier relapse was predicted by baseline difficulties in
decentering from recent negative memories (43.7 ± 9.60
years)52. Poorer decentering skills in this cohort were also
associated with more severe residual symptoms of
depression4. However, enhancing decentering-related
abilities in the initial stages of remission can sig-
nificantly reduce relapse risk. In a recent study with adults
experiencing remission, ACT was associated with lower
residual depression after 12 months and this was medi-
ated by increases in cognitive defusion and psychological
flexibility (40.77 ± 11.9 years)78. Decentering also
increased in adults in remission who received follow-up
care using MBCT and this predicted lower residual
depression symptoms after 6 months (44.8 ± 9.4 years)74.
Similarly, MBCT and CBT improved decentering in
adults experiencing relapse from depression and this
reduced relapse over a 24-month follow-up period
(40.41–40.85 years)90,93. Interestingly, decreases in dys-
functional self-relevant beliefs during CBT (not MBCT)
but this was unrelated to relapse risk93. This suggests that
altering the way individuals experience negative inner
events, rather than changing the content of these events,
promotes sustained reductions in symptoms.
Few have investigated the effects of teaching decenter-
ing prior to anxiety or depression onset. However, there is
some evidence of salutary effects in healthy individuals.
Training of distancing techniques was associated with
lower daily stress and a spontaneous tendency to provide
a neutral evaluation of negative images (~23.9 years)94.
Increased EQ scores also mediated the beneficial effects of
mindfulness training on anxiety and low mood in non-
symptomatic adults (49–54 years)75,76. Also, and in a
cohort of university students experiencing elevated psy-
chological distress, a brief acceptance-based program was
associated with increased decentering and decreased
stress and social anxiety (25.40 ± 7.86 years)77.
Treatment based changes in youth decentering
One research gap is evident and particularly salient
given this review’s focus. Few studies (if any) have inves-
tigated if increased decentering mediates the beneficial
impact of psychological interventions in youth anxiety
and depression. The mean age across the clinical trials
described in this review (k= 20; Table 2) is 36 years and
the youngest cohort we identified were around 25
years77,83. However, 75% of psychiatric disorders begin
before 24 years95. The median age of onset for anxiety is
around 11–15 years95,96, and 10% of adolescents begin to
experience re-occurrent major depression before 17
years97. Childhood and adolescence is a well-established
window for the development of mental health difficulties
but is under-represented in this literature. Thus, it is not
known: [1] whether psychological interventions reduce
youth anxiety and depression via improvements in
decentering, as observed across adulthood; or [2] whether
reinforcing decentering via psychological interventions
confers protection against the future onset of anxiety and
depression in at-risk youths. These are key areas for future
research, especially given that adolescents is a unique
period of neuro-developmental change98,99 and findings
based on adult research may not be directly generalizable.
A small number of recent studies described programs
that reinforce decentering-related abilities during adoles-
cence. The rationale is that teaching pre-symptomatic
adolescents techniques to manage everyday psychological
stressors may be an impactful way to promote well-being.
Adolescents practiced a guided self-distancing technique
over 10 days (18.47 ± 0.69 year)100. This involved recalling
a stress-relevant event before taking a mental ‘step back’
to observe the event from a self-distanced perspective.
Afterwards, participants wrote a short narrative about this
experience. Fewer negative words and less ruminative
processing was evident in the self-distanced group relative
to a comparison group. However, there was no change in
daily negative affect ratings in those practicing self-
distancing. Also, it was not reported whether decentering-
related abilities improved with practice. Another study
examined a 30-min web-based cognitive defusion pro-
gram for negative self-referential thinking in adolescents
(19.61 ± 1.58 years)101. This resulted in large reductions in
the believability of, and distress associated with, self-
critical thoughts (d= 0.87–1.35). However, neither this
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study nor similar ones recorded changes in trait cognitive
fusion or decentering63,101–103. It is therefore unclear:
whether youth decentering-related abilities are sensitive
to change or; whether decentering-related abilities can be
improved using targeted training. Meanwhile in adults
experiencing remission from depression, selectively
teaching decentering resulted in higher trait decentering
and lower residual symptoms (50.81 ± 12.10 years)104.
Conclusion
Whether, how, why, and when decentering alleviates
youth anxiety and depression?
To try answer this question, we conducted a robust
review of literature and our findings were as follows.
Decentering is an early emergent ability that is con-
tinuously distributed across individuals. Those at the
higher end of this continuum are at lower risk of anxiety
and depression, across the lifespan. Evidence also suggests
that decentering mitigates mental ill health by dampening
the emotional impact of day-to-day psychological stres-
sors that otherwise increase depression and anxiety risk:
stressors include inner events such as distressing
thoughts, feelings and memories. Better understanding
this ability may therefore have implications for youth
mental health and psychological interventions. In fact,
evidence suggest decentering is a core component of
psychological interventions whereby treatment-related
improvements in this skill facilitate decreases in anxiety
and depression severity. A range of extant psychological
interventions (including CBT, ACT, and MBCT) have
been shown to improve decentering-related abilities, and
the magnitude of this improvement may mediate down-
stream decreases in anxiety and depression severity.
Furthermore, the reinforcement of decentering may be
a universally relevant component of psychological inter-
ventions. This is because it targets day-to-day psycholo-
gical stressors experienced by, not only those currently
experiencing symptoms, but also those who may be pre-
symptomatic or even recovering from depression or
anxiety. This is supported by emerging evidence that
reinforcement of decentering-related skills can be helpful
at each multiple of mental health, including primary
prevention, treatment and relapse prevention. Although a
greater understanding of when and how best improve
decentering-related abilities is required.
Implications for practice and future research in youth
anxiety and depression
Anxiety and depression are global health challenges
with the majority of cases emerging before the age of 24
years105,106. This points to an urgent need to equip young
people with strategies that help them influence the way
psychological distress is experienced. In particular, we
believe it is important to cultivate (from an early age)
skills to adaptively manage everyday psychological stres-
sors (e.g. distressing feeling, thoughts, memories), which
involved in anxiety and depression onset and main-
tenance. We also believe that decentering is a promising
candidate for three practical reasons. First, by shifting
one’s self-perspective, people can still interact with psy-
chological stressors without allowing them to dis-
proportionately influence mood and behavior. This might
help to, not only ameliorate distress in those experiencing
symptoms, but also delimit youth anxiety and depression
onset. Second, evidence suggests that ability to influence
self-perspective can be strengthened with time and prac-
tice. This means it is a modifiable skill that can be directly
reinforced. Finally, therapeutic techniques that boost
decentering are already embedded within extant psycho-
logical interventions. It may be possible to isolate and
amalgamate these modules so as to selectively train
decentering in educational and care settings.
A number of research gaps must be addressed to fulfill
the translational potential of decentering research (Sup-
plemental Box 1). Among these is a lack of evidence
indicating whether psychological interventions that rein-
force decentering at an early age can delay anxiety and
depression onset. The majority of clinical trials focus on
symptomatic adults rather than pre-symptomatic young
people. Another clear barrier is the paucity of child and
adolescent-friendly measures of decentering-related abil-
ities, as well as longitudinal investigations into the
development of this skill. Finally, it is also important to
identify the functional boundaries of decentering-related
abilities in young people as well as the underlying neuro-
cognitive correlates. Such insights have the potential to
improve youth mental well-being, promote thriving across
development and optimize the effectiveness of extant
psychological interventions if and when they are needed.
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